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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CUAL CO., 
EMERY MINING CORP., and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff/appellant, Case No. 19134 
vs. 
TERRY W. SANDSTROM, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
NATURE OF THE CA$E 
The Appellant State Insurance Fund is seeking 
reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under Section 35-1-69 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INOUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Order and the Supplemental Order of the 
Industrial Commission addressed two issues: The first issue 
was whether, under Section 35-1-69, as amended, and which 
became effective May 12, 1981, the State Insur_ance Fund was 
eligible for reimbursement for payments for the accident of 
11/23/81 of medical care and temporary total disability prior 
to the applicant's date of stabilization. The Order held: 
"Tne State Insurance Fund is not entitled to reimbursement• for 
that period. (R-213) The second issue raised was whether 
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated applies to the Second 
Injury Fund as well as to the employer/insurance carrier. The 
Order held that "the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred" dia not apply to the Second Injury Fund. (R-204) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request the Order of the Industrial 
Commission denying reimbursement to the State Insurance Fund 
under the amended portion of §35-1-69 Utah Code Annotated for 
temporary total disability and payments for medical care be 
affirmed. Respondents further request that the denying of the 
Second Injury Fund to the provisions of Section 35-1-99 be 
reversed and that any claim for compensation be wholly barred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sandstrom sustained personal injury in four separate 
accidents arising out of or in the course of his employment. 
The dates ot these accidents are as follows: November 21, 
1977, May 4, December 17, 1980, and November 23, 1981. 
(R-39) 
The first three accidents were while employed by 
American Coal Company, who in 1980 changed their name to Emery 
Mining Corporation and in November of 1981 he was employed by 
Gusco, Inc. (R-38, 39) 
The State Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier 
for both employers and all the accidents. On July 30, 1982, 
the State Insurance Fund entered into a settlement agreement 
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with Sandstrom for the 1981 accident only and was for 10% of 
1.iie The Second Injury Fund was not a party to that 
agreement. 
Tnere was no permanent impairment attributed to the 
1979 accident. 
As a result of the other three accidents, applicant 
has sufferea a total overall impairment of 20% permanent 
partial disability of the whole man to his back and 10% 
permanent partial disability of the whole man to his neck. 
(R-39) There was also a Settlement Agreement of all the parties 
of January 11, 1983. Appellant's Brief. 
In addition to the question of reimbursement under 
amendea §35-!-b9, the question was raised as to whether claims 
which are "wholly barred" applies to the Second Injury Fund. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Does Section 35-1-69 provide for reimbursement to the 
insurance carrier for medical expenses and temporary total 
disability compensation up to the time of stabilization of 
injuriPs W1der the 1981 amendment? A second issue is whether 
Section 35-1-99 applies to the Second Injury Fund. 
A corillary issue concerning the first issue on 
reimbursement is whether the settlement agreement of July 30, 
1982, between Sandstrom and the State Insurance Fund can later 
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be redefined or altered to allow the State Insurance Fund to 
obtain reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Order of the Industrial Commission interpreting 
the 1981 amendment or §35-1-69 must be confirmed when supported 
by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. 
As stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. y. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888 (1981), and reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic Service 
y. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (1982), and in Kincheloe y. State 
Insurance Fund, 656 P.2d 440, (1982), the scope of review in 
Industrial Commission cases is limited to: 
[W]hether the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" or without "any 
substantial evidence" to support them. Only 
then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. 
The conclusions reached by the Commission regarding 
the claimed apportionment by the Appellants under Section 35-1-
69 are entirely consistent with what the Commission knew the 
changes meant that were made by the legislature to Section 69. 
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ARGUMENT II 
l981 AMENDMENTS TO 35-1-69 SPECIFICALLY DISALLOWED 
APPORTIONMENT FOR MEDICALS AND TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
UP TO THE END OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
As has been stated before and as the surge of 
appealed cases to this court testifies, the cases of McPhie y. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976), Intermountain 
Health Carey. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977), Wbite y. 
Industrial Co!lllDission, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979) and 
Intermountain Smelting Corp. y. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 
1980) drastically changed the concept of the law of workmen's 
compensation that had been successfully followed for more than 
thirty years. One of the severe changes was in giving 
reimbursement to the insurance carrier for medical expenses and 
total temporary disability compensation. The reimbursement was 
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund on the basis of the 
percentage of permanent partial disability attributable to any 
pre-existing condition, related or non-related to the 
industrial injuries. No state law has made such reimbursement 
eitter hy or court ruling. 
To bring back some logic to this direction forced 
upon the Commission, amendments were proposed in 1981 to the 
legislature by Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council. This 
Council has members representing the employer, the employee and 
the insurance carrier. 
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The changes made by the legislature in Section 35-1-
69 followed the agreed upon amendments prepared by the Advisory 
Council. One of the important amendments was for the very 
purpose or reversing the ability of carriers to receive 
reimbursement for medicals and temporary total disability 
compensation on the basis of the percentage of pre-existing 
impairment for the first period of temporary total disability 
resulting from the industrial injury. 
The following paragraph is entirely new language. 
Where the payment of temporary disability 
benefits, medical expenses, or other related 
items are required as a result of the industrial 
injury subject to this section, the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be responsible for 
all such temporary benefits. medical care, or 
other related items up to the end of the period 
of temporary total disability resulting from the 
industrial injury. Any allocation of 
disability benefits, medical care, or other 
related items following such a period shall be 
made between the employer or its insurer and the 
second injury fund as provided for herein, and 
any payments made by the employer and its 
insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate 
share shall be recoverable at the time of the 
award for combined disabilities if any is made 
hereunder. Utah Code Ano. §35-1-69 (Supp. 
1981). (Emphasis added.) 
It snould be noted that the non-apportionment is •up 
to the end of the period of temporary total disability 
resulting from the industrial injury.• This language allows 
apportionment for future medicals and future temporary total 
disability that occurs after the initial period of temporary 
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total disability has ended. This language of allocation 
such a period was insisted upon by some members of 
the Advisory Council who didn't want to give up all the 
benefits which had accrued to the carriers under the court 
interpretation of the old statute. 
The amended statute by its wording and by specific 
intent now provides for reimbursement only after the initial 
period of temporary total disability. 
The legislative amendment was drafted by the Council 
to read that the employer was obligated to pay all benefits for 
the first period of temporary total disability, and that after 
such a period, there would be an apportionment between the 
employer and the Second Injury Fund for •future" benefits. The 
language of the 1981 amendment above clearly states that the 
employer or insurance carrier shall pay compensation benefits 
and medical care during the first period of temporary total 
disability caused by the industrial accident and then after 
"such a period,• there would be an apportionment between the 
employer and the Second Injury Fund for "future" benefits. 
This case is the first one brought under this 
particular part of amended Section 69. The cases cited by the 
State Insurance Fund do not pertain and are not relevant to the 
amended language ot that section. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 35-1-99 WHICH STATES THAT 
"IF NO CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IS FILED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE 
ACCIDENT OR THE DATE OF THE LAST PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION, 
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION SHALL BE WHOLLY BARRED," 
APPLIES TO THE SECOND INJURY FUND 
The Administrative Law Judge, over the objections of 
the Second Injury Fund (R-42, 204 and 213) incorrectly 
determined that Section 99 did not apply to the Second Injury 
Fund. The Order then said the Second Injury Fund must pay 
compensation and medical for the 1977 and 1979 accidents as 
they pre-existed the last accidents, even though the carrier 
for all the accidents, the State Insurance Fund, claims 
exeptions because of Section 99. 
The wording ot the statute is clear and must apply to 
all insurers and obligors: " ••• IF NO CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION 
IS WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM 
THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT OR THE DATE OF THE LAST PAYMENT OF 
COMPENSATION, THE RIGHT TO COMPENSTION SHALL BE WUOLLY 
emphasis added. 
Obviously the purpose of Section 35-1-99 is to bar 
stale or untimely filed claims. The Statute is clear in its 
wording that such claims are wholly barred, not solely barred 
against the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Section 35-1-99 did read that - - the right to 
compensation shall be wholly barred but that if you fail to 
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file a claim within three years you can always receive your 
compensation from the Second Injury Fund as a pre-existing 
condition. Such a reading would destroy or abolish the effect 
of Section Should the Industrial Commission interpret 
Section to read as such, the effect of such an 
interpretation is that no claims are wholly barred. In other 
words, if the applicant or the applicant's attorney can not 
resurrect an old utimely filed claim against the employer, the 
party can file for a hearing on a new claim alleging that the 
new industrial injury aggravated the "wholly barred" injuries 
and therefore, those wholly barred injuries are now pre-
existing conditions allowing for compensation from the Second 
Injury Fund for the previously wholly barred claims. 
Consequently, there is no such statute as a wholly barred 
claim and the effect is to eliminate Section 35-1-99. 
Should it be the desire to alter Section 35-1-99, 
such a change should be made by the State Legislature in 
redrafting the Statute, and not for the Industrial Commission 
or our courts to interpret the Statute to read that a "wholly 
barred claim" does not really mean a claim is wholly barred, 
but that the claim is merely barred against the defendant 
employer and not the other defendant. 
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The arguments, if there are any, that Section 35-1-99 
is an applicable defense against the employer or its insurance 
carrier only, and not the Second Injury Fund would likely be: 
1. Pursuant to prior court determinations, 
a wholly barred claim under Section 35-1-99 has 
never been applied as a defense against the 
right of an applicant to receive compenstion 
from the Second Injury Fund. 
2. Pursuant to Section 35-1-69, the Second 
Injury Fund must pay compensation on all pre-
existing incapacities regrdless if the claims 
are wholly barred under Section 35-1-99. 
The first argument fails because the Utah Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed the issue of the 
applicability of the statute of limitations defense under the 
Utah Coae against the liabiity of the Second Injury Fund. The 
Court has not held that Section 35-1-99 does not apply against 
the Second Injury Fund and that if a claim is wholly barred 
against the employer, the claim is not "wholly barred" but that 
the applicant can now be paid by the Second Injury Fund as a 
pre-existing incapacity. The Second Injury Fund is a separate 
entity and as such should be allowed to raise the same defenses 
under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes as any other party 
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defendant, as the Supreme Court stated in Paoli y. Cottonwood 
656 P.2d 410 (Utah 1982). 
"The.law creating the Second Injury Fund 
provides • • • shall • • • represent the Second 
Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to 
enforce claims against it • • • The latter 
provisions established the Legislature intent 
that the Second injury Fund has the capacity to 
defend itself against the claims ••• (under 
the Workmen's Compensation Statutes) ••• 
pursuant to that intent, we have consistently 
treated the Second Injury Fund as a separate 
entity for the purposes of its defense and 
liability for claims ••• n 
The Court further stated: 
The current employer is only responsible for the 
percentage of permanent impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury (or injuries), and the 
Second Injury Fund is responsible for the 
remainder • • • • 
The second possible argument is also based on a false 
presumption. The Second Injury Fund does not pay on all pre-
existing incapacities. Under Calyin Dayid y. Industrial 
Commjssion, 649 P.2d 282 (1982), the second Injury Fund does 
not pay compenstion for a pre-existing impairment that has 
already been compensated. Also, pursuant to Section 35-1-99, 
the Second Injury Fund does n.o.t. pay compensation on a claim 
that has been wholly barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
It is necessary, of course, that the barring of 
claims under Section 99 applied only to industrial accidents 
and not to previously incurred incapacities which were not from 
industrial accidents. 
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To find that the wholly barred industrial claims of 
1977 and 1979 can be reinstated as a pre-existing condition, 
allows this applicant, and all other similarly situated, to 
circumvent this section of the law. The language of the 
Statute is clear and convincing that the 1967 and 1976 claims 
may be wholly barred as they apply to both employer and the 
Second Injury Fund. To allow such claims to come through the 
back as a pre-existing claims, would open the back door to all 
prior claims tht have been barred by Section 35-1-99. 
ARGUMENT IV 
COMPENSATION AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 1981 
ACCIDENT WERE "SETTLED" BY THE JULY 30, 1983 AGREEMENT. 
Altllough the previous argument (II) under the 
1981 amendment to Section 69 is controlling the Second Injury 
Fund is likewise not subject to reimbursing the State Insurance 
Fund for 50% of the medicals and total temporary disability 
because the 1981 accident had been settled. A settlement 
agreement was made between the State Insurance Fund and Mr. 
Sandstrom on July 30, 1982 (R-194). The State Insurance Fund 
cannot now to their benefit after their legal obligation as 
stipulated by them in their prior negotiated agreement in order 
to refer the case to include reimbursement from the Second 
Injury Fund. See this Respondent's Brief in Rhodes y. 
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Industrial Commission, tl9163, a case which is now before the 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commissions Order denying the State Insurance 
Fund from receiving reimbursement for medicals and temporary 
total disability compensation up to the end of the initial 
period ot temporary total disability should be affirmed. Such 
a position was intended and is made clear by the amendments to 
Section 35-1-69. 
Section 99 precludes any obligation on the Second 
Injury Fund for claims which bar recovery from the State 
Insurance Fund and other issuers. 
DATED this _ .... ..... 7Ji.=-- day of August, 1983. 
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